Mid-Range Frequency

Mid-Range Frequency in basketball analytics measures what percentage of a player's or team's field goal attempts come from the mid-range area, typically defined as two-point shots taken outside the paint but inside the three-point line, roughly 8-23 feet from the basket. This metric has become particularly significant in modern basketball analytics as it quantifies usage of the least analytically favored shot type, making it crucial for evaluating shot selection efficiency, strategic alignment with modern principles, and identifying potential areas for offensive optimization. Mid-Range Frequency serves as a key indicator of whether players and teams follow contemporary analytical orthodoxy emphasizing three-point attempts and rim attacks (both more efficient than mid-range) or maintain traditional approaches featuring significant mid-range shooting. The calculation of Mid-Range Frequency follows the formula: (Mid-Range Field Goal Attempts / Total Field Goal Attempts) × 100 percent. A player who attempts 6 mid-range shots out of 20 total attempts shows 30 percent mid-range frequency. Player tracking systems precisely identify mid-range attempts through coordinate data measuring exact shot distance, typically classifying attempts from 8 feet (outside the paint) to the three-point line as mid-range, though some analyses further divide this into short mid-range (8-16 feet) and long mid-range (16 feet to three-point line). Historically, mid-range shooting represented a cornerstone of traditional basketball offense, with mid-range frequency for many players and teams exceeding 40-50 percent in the 1990s and early 2000s. Post players operated from mid-range after establishing position, guards pulled up from mid-range off pick-and-rolls, and isolation players attacked from mid-range. However, advanced analytics revealed mid-range attempts as the least efficient shot type: mid-range jumpers typically convert at 38-42 percent (generating 0.76-0.84 points per shot), significantly below three-point attempts at 35+ percent (1.05+ PPS) and rim attempts at 60+ percent (1.20+ PPS). The analytical revolution against mid-range frequency accelerated in the 2010s as teams increasingly recognized efficiency advantages of alternative shot locations. League-wide mid-range frequency declined from 40+ percent in the early 2000s to under 15 percent by 2020, with some analytically aggressive teams showing mid-range frequency below 10 percent. This dramatic strategic shift represents one of the clearest manifestations of analytics' influence on basketball, fundamentally changing offensive shot selection across the sport. Points Per Shot analysis drives the analytical case against high mid-range frequency. A 40 percent mid-range shooter generates 0.80 points per shot (40 percent × 2 points). To match a 36 percent three-point shooter's efficiency (1.08 PPS), a mid-range shooter must convert at 54 percent, a rate achieved by only elite mid-range specialists. To match a 60 percent rim shooter (1.20 PPS), mid-range percentage must reach 60 percent, essentially impossible except on the easiest attempts. These efficiency gaps explain analytical emphasis on minimizing mid-range frequency. Player role and position significantly affect appropriate mid-range frequency. Traditional post players might maintain mid-range frequency of 25-35 percent through post-up fadeaways and face-up jumpers. Guards who excel as pick-and-roll operators might show 20-30 percent mid-range frequency through pull-ups when defenses concede them. However, role players and developing players are typically coached toward near-zero mid-range frequency, emphasizing threes and rim attempts exclusively. Superstar shot creators might justify moderate mid-range frequency through elite conversion rates. Mid-range efficiency requirements for justifying significant mid-range frequency are demanding. Players with mid-range frequency above 30 percent should convert at 45+ percent to avoid dragging down offensive efficiency. Those shooting under 42 percent from mid-range should dramatically reduce mid-range frequency regardless of current volume. Elite mid-range shooters like Chris Paul, Kevin Durant, and DeMar DeRozan convert at 48-52+ percent, justifying their higher mid-range frequency through exceptional skill, though even they face analytical questions about optimal shot distribution. Dropped coverage defensive schemes strategically concede mid-range attempts to prevent threes and rim attacks, effectively challenging offensive players to beat them with mid-range shooting. Against drop coverage, mid-range frequency naturally increases as defenses invite pull-up mid-range jumpers. Teams must decide whether to accept these "open" mid-range attempts or reject them seeking better shots. Players who cannot capitalize on drop coverage through efficient mid-range shooting allow defenses to drop without penalty. Mid-range frequency in isolation and pick-and-roll situations often exceeds overall mid-range frequency, as these actions create mid-range pull-up opportunities. Elite pick-and-roll operators show mid-range frequency of 35-45 percent on pick-and-roll possessions specifically, using the threat of mid-range to keep defenses honest and create driving lanes. However, even in these contexts, analytics suggests preferring threes and rim attempts when available rather than settling for mid-range. Short mid-range (8-16 feet) versus long mid-range (16 feet to three-point line) frequency reveals tactical nuance within overall mid-range frequency. Short mid-range attempts typically succeed at slightly higher rates (40-45 percent) than long mid-range (38-42 percent) due to shorter distance. Some players show willingness to take short mid-range floaters or pull-ups while avoiding long mid-range, accepting minor efficiency reductions from optimal shots rather than forcing into traffic. Long mid-range particularly frustrates analysts given only slightly longer distance yields three-point value. Transition mid-range frequency typically remains low even for mid-range-oriented players, as transition creates rim attempt opportunities and early offense threes before defenses set. High mid-range frequency in transition suggests poor shot selection, passing up higher-value opportunities. Teams emphasize attacking the rim or pulling for early threes in transition rather than settling for mid-range, reserving mid-range primarily for half-court offense when defenses limit better options. Clutch situation mid-range frequency often increases relative to overall frequency as defenses intensify in crucial moments, limiting threes and rim attempts. Players and teams resort to mid-range shot creation in late-clock and late-game situations when defenses prevent optimal shots. Elite clutch performers who maintain efficiency on mid-range attempts in these moments provide valuable pressure-situation scoring. However, analytics suggests pursuing threes and rim attempts even in clutch situations when possible. Age-related mid-range frequency changes reveal tactical adjustments as athleticism evolves. Young athletic players typically show low mid-range frequency through rim attacks and spot-up threes. Prime players might add mid-range to their arsenal while maintaining rim aggression. Aging players often show increasing mid-range frequency as they lose athleticism for rim attacks but maintain mid-range shooting skill. This age curve explains why veteran-heavy teams sometimes show higher mid-range frequency than young athletic teams. Coaching philosophy dramatically affects team mid-range frequency. Analytically aggressive coaches like Mike D'Antoni and Daryl Morey minimize mid-range frequency to extreme levels (often under 10 percent), while traditional coaches permit higher frequencies. Player personnel also matters: teams with elite mid-range shooters might accommodate higher frequency, while those lacking mid-range skill maximize efficiency by avoiding it entirely. Optimal mid-range frequency depends on personnel shooting ability and strategic philosophy. Mid-range frequency on assisted versus unassisted attempts reveals shot creation context. Unassisted mid-range frequency indicates self-creation, often from isolation or pick-and-roll. Assisted mid-range frequency suggests catch-and-shoot opportunities from mid-range, relatively rare in modern basketball as teams emphasize assisted threes and cuts to the rim over mid-range passes. High assisted mid-range frequency might indicate offense stagnation creating only mid-range passing opportunities. Defensive mid-range frequency allowed measures what percentage of opponent attempts come from mid-range, indicating defensive strategy effectiveness. Defenses aiming to eliminate threes and rim attempts force higher opponent mid-range frequency as offenses settle for conceded mid-range shots. Effective modern defenses force opponent mid-range frequency above 25-30 percent while holding opponent three-point and rim frequency below league average. However, forcing mid-range attempts only helps if opponents convert inefficiently. Playoff mid-range frequency often increases relative to regular season as playoff defenses intensify, better game planning limits optimal shots, and half-court offense predominates over transition. Teams and players who avoid mid-range in the regular season might show 20-25 percent playoff mid-range frequency when elite defenses force them to settle. Elite playoff offenses maintain low mid-range frequency through superior shot creation, while offenses lacking creation resort to mid-range. Foul-drawing and mid-range frequency show inverse correlation, as mid-range jump shots rarely draw fouls compared to rim attempts (contact on drives and post-ups) or three-point attempts (closeout fouls). Players with high mid-range frequency typically show lower free throw rates. This adds to mid-range's analytical problems: not only lower point value, but also fewer free throw opportunities compared to rim attacks. Player development regarding mid-range frequency typically emphasizes reduction for young players, teaching shot selection prioritizing threes and rim attempts. Coaches actively discourage mid-range attempts through film study, practice design, and in-game feedback. However, some elite prospects are encouraged to develop mid-range shooting as a counter to defensive schemes preventing threes and rim attempts, with understanding that it should supplement rather than dominate their shot diet. Mid-range frequency variance across lineups reveals how personnel affects shot selection. Lineups with spacing and penetration show lower mid-range frequency through better shot creation. Lineups lacking shooting or creation show higher mid-range frequency from offense breaking down into mid-range bailouts. Optimal lineup construction includes creation and spacing enabling low mid-range frequency through better shot quality. Shot clock mid-range frequency shows late-clock increases as teams resort to mid-range bailouts when primary offense fails. Early clock mid-range frequency should be minimal, reserved for truly elite mid-range shooters attacking specific defensive vulnerabilities. Late clock (18-24 seconds) mid-range frequency often reaches 30-40 percent as players settle for available shots rather than forcing into heavy traffic. This pattern validates analytical mid-range skepticism: many mid-range attempts are forced rather than chosen. Opponent-adjusted mid-range frequency accounts for defensive schemes faced. Against drop coverage teams, mid-range frequency naturally increases as these defenses concede pull-ups. Against aggressive switching teams, mid-range frequency might decrease as switching limits mid-range opportunities while creating other advantages. Opponent-adjusted metrics reveal whether mid-range frequency reflects player preference versus defensive forcing. Historical mid-range masters like Dirk Nowitzki, Kobe Bryant, and Michael Jordan maintained high mid-range frequency while achieving elite efficiency through exceptional skill. Their success with mid-range shooting created lasting influence on basketball culture despite analytics questioning mid-range value. Modern analysts acknowledge these players' elite mid-range ability while noting that most players cannot replicate their mid-range efficiency, making low mid-range frequency optimal for typical players. Limitations of mid-range frequency analysis include inability to capture shot quality within mid-range attempts, missing strategic context about why mid-range attempts occur, and difficulty distinguishing choice versus necessity. Open mid-range differs from contested. Some mid-range attempts serve purposes beyond point maximization (drawing fouls, setting up later possessions, confidence building). Not all mid-range frequency is equal: high frequency from poor shooters differs from moderate frequency from elite mid-range specialists. The future of mid-range frequency analysis will likely involve more sophisticated conditional metrics: mid-range frequency controlling for defensive coverage, expected mid-range frequency given lineup and opponent, and optimal mid-range frequency based on individual shooting ability. As defenses continue adapting to three-point emphasis, mid-range shooting might experience limited renaissance as an exploited inefficiency, though analytics suggests this remains unlikely for most players. In contemporary basketball analytics, Mid-Range Frequency serves as a crucial indicator of shot selection quality and strategic modernity. The metric's sustained decline league-wide represents one of basketball's clearest analytical success stories, with teams collectively moving toward more efficient shot distributions. However, nuance remains important: elite mid-range shooters can justify higher frequency, and certain game situations demand mid-range attempts. Teams use mid-range frequency analysis for shot selection coaching, player evaluation, strategic planning, and assessing analytical alignment. As basketball continues evolving, mid-range frequency will remain essential for understanding offensive efficiency and shot selection optimization.