Go Under Screen

Go under screen is a defensive technique used when navigating ball screens where the defender takes a path beneath the screen, between the screener and the basket, rather than fighting over the top or switching assignments. This screen coverage method prioritizes preventing drives to the basket over contesting jump shots, accepting that the ball handler may receive space for a perimeter jumper in exchange for maintaining a defender between the ball and the rim. The strategy reflects a calculated defensive decision based on opponent shooting ability, game situation, and team defensive philosophy, representing one of the fundamental options in pick-and-roll defense alongside fighting over, switching, and hedging. The philosophy behind going under screens centers on risk management and forcing opponents into lower-percentage shots. Against ball handlers who are not dangerous perimeter shooters, going under concedes the least efficient shot in basketball - the contested mid-range or long two-point jumper - while preventing more efficient attempts at the rim. This approach forces offensive players to beat defenses with shots they're less comfortable taking, exploiting their relative weaknesses rather than allowing them to attack their strengths. The mathematical logic reflects modern basketball analytics emphasizing rim protection and three-point prevention over mid-range defense. The technical execution of going under screens requires specific positioning and footwork. As the ball handler approaches the screen, the defender recognizes they will go under based on scouting reports or coaching instructions. Rather than fighting over the screener's body, the defender drops below the screen, maintaining a path between the screener and the basket. The defender typically maintains low positioning with hands up to contest any immediate jumper attempt while staying close enough to the ball handler to recover quickly if they drive. The key is avoiding getting caught on the screener's body while maintaining enough proximity to pressure the ball handler. Historically, going under screens has been employed against non-shooting guards and forwards who rely primarily on driving and athletic ability rather than perimeter shooting. Defenders historically went under screens against players like Rajon Rondo, John Wall, or Ben Simmons, who posed minimal three-point threats but were dangerous when allowed downhill driving lanes. This tactical approach leveraged opponents' shooting weaknesses, daring them to beat defenses with jumpers while protecting against their primary scoring methods. The rise of analytics has formalized these instincts into systematic defensive strategies. Going under screens in drop coverage schemes represents the most common systematic application. Drop coverage has the screener's defender drop back toward the basket while the ball handler's defender goes under, creating a wall of two defenders protecting the rim. This coordinated approach prevents easy baskets at the rim, the most efficient shots in basketball, while conceding the least efficient mid-range attempts. Teams like the Milwaukee Bucks with Brook Lopez have built elite defenses around drop-and-under principles, accepting perimeter jumpers to prevent rim attacks. The decision-making process for when to go under versus fight over or switch depends on multiple contextual factors. Opponent shooting ability represents the primary consideration - going under against capable three-point shooters results in open threes, the second-most efficient shot. Game situation matters, as going under might be acceptable in regular season games but unwise in playoff elimination scenarios. Score and time considerations influence risk tolerance. Defensive personnel and scheme determine baseline coverage tendencies. Synthesizing these factors determines optimal screen coverage. Going under screens against elite pick-and-roll ball handlers creates specific challenges, as skilled players can exploit the space created by going under for comfortable pull-up jumpers or quick drives before defenders recover. Players like Chris Paul or Luka Doncic punish under coverage by pulling up for mid-range jumpers or manipulating defenders with hesitation moves. Against these players, going under might prove ineffective despite their shooting percentages, as their pick-and-roll mastery allows them to capitalize on any coverage. This illustrates how individual skill can override general strategic principles. Physical demands of going under screens differ from fighting over, as the technique emphasizes positioning and distance management over physical navigation through screens. Defenders must maintain defensive stance and readiness to move while going under, prepared to close out to jumpers or recover to drives. The mental processing required to recognize when to go under and execute properly challenges defenders, particularly when opponents mix shooters and non-shooters requiring different coverage approaches. Consistency in executing coverage assignments requires both physical capability and mental discipline. Communication requirements for going under screens ensure all defenders understand coverage and rotate appropriately. Verbal calls of "under" signal to teammates the intended coverage, allowing the screener's defender to adjust their help accordingly. Miscommunication between the ball handler's defender and screener's defender creates confusion that offenses exploit for easy baskets. Clear, early communication prevents these breakdowns, maintaining defensive coordination throughout pick-and-roll actions. Teams that communicate coverage clearly defend screens more effectively. Going under screens against different screen types and angles requires technical adjustments. Against high ball screens set near the three-point line, going under creates more distance to recover for drives, making the technique safer. Against angle screens or drag screens, going under requires careful positioning to maintain defensive integrity. Against slip screens, defenders going under must recognize the slip and adjust, potentially switching to prevent layups. Reading screen variations and adjusting technique demonstrates defensive awareness and versatility. Coaching decisions about going under screens reflect broader defensive philosophies and personnel considerations. Teams with elite rim protectors might go under more frequently, trusting their interior defenders to protect if ball handlers penetrate. Teams lacking rim protection might fight over more consistently to prevent any rim attacks. Teams with versatile perimeter defenders might switch rather than going under or fighting over. These philosophical choices create defensive identities and determine how teams approach pick-and-roll defense systematically. Going under screens in transition situations presents unique considerations, as the speed of play and limited help defense make coverage decisions more critical. Going under transition screens can result in wide-open jumpers if ball handlers are capable shooters, as help defense hasn't established. However, fighting over in transition creates driving lanes without help support. These trade-offs often make switching preferable in transition, avoiding the vulnerabilities of both going under and fighting over. Reading transition situations and making appropriate coverage decisions challenges defenders. Offensive counters to going under screens include pull-up jumpers from the ball handler, re-screens to create additional separation, and aggressive drives that attack before defenders fully recover position. Ball handlers who develop reliable pull-up jumpers neutralize the under coverage, forcing defenders to play up and respect the shot. Screeners who re-screen after the initial screen create confusion and additional separation. Quick, aggressive drives attack the space before defenders recover. These counters force defensive adjustments and prevent going under from being a universal solution. Going under screens impacts individual and team defensive statistics in measurable ways. Teams that go under frequently might allow higher opponent mid-range attempt rates but lower three-point and rim attempt rates. Individual defenders going under show different shot contest patterns than fighters-over, contesting fewer immediate shots but preventing more direct rim attacks. Advanced tracking data reveals how going under influences shot selection and offensive efficiency. These statistics validate or question strategic decisions about when to employ under coverage. Young players learning when to go under versus fight over require clear teaching about the strategic reasoning and proper execution. Initial instruction explains the logic behind going under - conceding lower-percentage shots to prevent higher-percentage attempts. Scouting report education teaches which opponents warrant going under based on their shooting profiles. Drill work practices proper positioning and footwork for going under. Game application with coaching feedback builds judgment about when going under is appropriate. Progressive development creates defenders who execute coverage properly. Going under screens in playoff basketball requires adjusting to increased offensive sophistication and scouting. Playoff opponents exploit weaknesses systematically, attacking teams that go under too predictably or against the wrong players. The higher stakes make the trade-offs more significant - allowing open jumpers in playoff games carries greater consequences than regular season. Intensity and physicality impact technique, as fatigue from playoff effort makes recovering from under coverage more difficult. Championship-level teams adapt their screen coverage based on opponent and situation. The relationship between going under screens and broader team defensive concepts illustrates integration within comprehensive schemes. Help defense positioning adjusts based on whether defenders go under, as help must be ready to support if penetration occurs. Rebounding responsibilities shift when going under, as positioning differs from fighting over situations. Transition defense considerations include getting back rather than fighting through screens. Understanding these connections optimizes going under within team defensive contexts. Going under screens against modern spread pick-and-roll creates specific challenges, as the spacing provided by floor-spacing bigs makes recovering from under coverage more difficult. When screeners can shoot, they pop out for threes rather than rolling to the rim, creating two-player game situations where going under against one player can result in open threes for the other. This evolution in offensive tactics has made going under less viable against many modern pick-and-roll combinations. Defensive adaptation requires more sophisticated coverage approaches. The evolution toward increased three-point shooting has decreased how often teams go under screens, as more ball handlers possess three-point range that punishes under coverage. However, going under remains viable against specific non-shooting players and in specific situations where the mathematical trade-off favors conceding jumpers. As basketball analytics continue refining understanding of shot efficiency and defensive effectiveness, going under screens maintains relevance as a situational tool within comprehensive defensive strategies.